Newsroom

LOCATION Vienna

SPEAKER Simon Smith

EVENT IAEA's General Conference

DATE 16/09/2009

Thank you Madam Vice-President.

I would like to congratulate you on your election as the Vice-President of this Conference and to compliment the Secretariat on providing, once again, a first class service to Member States.

I would also like to add the congratulations of the United Kingdom to those states whom we have welcomed at this year’s General Conference as new members of the IAEA: the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Rwanda.

Madam Vice-President, I start by associating the United Kingdom fully with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Sweden on behalf of the European Union.

I will not restate the many points already made by the European Union. But I do not want to forgo the opportunity to put on record on behalf of the UK our salute to the outgoing Director General, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei and our profound appreciation for the immense dedication to the aims and ideals of the Agency that he has brought to his distinguished Director Generalship over the last twelve years. We now congratulate Ambassador Yukiya Amano on his appointment and we look forward with enthusiasm to doing all that we can to support him in making his leadership of the Agency successful and productive.

UK Road to 2010

Madam Vice-President, this year’s General Conference meets at a time when the nuclear question is central to the great and inter-connected challenges of our global society – global security, getting the global economy back on track, climate change and energy needs, global poverty and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Guided by this conviction the UK set out in its “Road to 2010” policy document published on 16 July, a vision on how we think the international community can best address these nuclear related issues in the coming years and how best to focus international efforts. Interested member states can obtain copies of the “Road to 2010” on request from the UK delegation. I will only expand now on the aspects which are most relevant to the work of the IAEA.

Future of the Agency – Towards a Stronger Organisation

The IAEA is at the forefront of international efforts to deliver a safe, secure and proliferation–free nuclear future. The UK believes it is essential for the Agency to maintain and strengthen this work. We therefore welcome the lively and constructive discussions that have taken place this year within the framework of the informal and open-ended process on “the Future of the Agency” and the role it should play in 2020 and beyond.

Expansion of nuclear energy

Madam Vice-President, nuclear power is a proven technology which generates low-carbon electricity. It is affordable, dependable, safe, and capable of increasing diversity of energy supply. The UK believes that nuclear power is an essential part of any global solution to the challenges of climate change and energy security. We do not seek to persuade other countries to develop nuclear power; that is a decision for independent sovereign governments. But we note the recent upward revision by the Agency of its nuclear power projections. And we proceed from the firm assumption that the coming years will see a significant increase in the use of nuclear energy. We are determined to engage in this new phase of nuclear energy in a way which maximises the opportunities, and minimises the risks.

One of the areas in which we seek to make a contribution is on the question of assurances of fuel supply. The UK concept for a Nuclear Fuel Assurance, which I presented last week to the Board of Governors, is part of this effort. The Nuclear Fuel Assurance facilitates access to nuclear energy, sparing countries the huge cost and technological challenge involved in establishing their own nuclear fuel cycle, while addressing existing concerns on the security of supply of nuclear fuel services. As the DG said in his introductory statement to the Board of Governors last week, our proposal is fully consistent with the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article IV of the NPT. We remain open to, indeed would welcome further comments and advice from Member States on our proposal as we continue to shape the concept into an effective mechanism ready for implementation.

As more states are now considering a nuclear power programme or seeking to expand an existing programme, we are convinced that the timing is right to ensure that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle are developed jointly by supplier and customer states to provide attractive and robust options that will contribute to meet increased nuclear fuel supply requirements over the long term.

A number of other proposals are also on the table. We welcome that: customer States should be able to choose from the widest possible range of non-discriminatory options to ensure the closest fit to their individual needs.

The Agency has a key role to play here, with its strengths as an objective guide, standard setter and monitor. We welcome in that regard the launch of the Agency’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review service.

UK New Build

Madam Vice-President, I turn now to the UK’s nuclear power programme. I reported last year to this Conference on the publication by my Government of a Nuclear Energy White Paper. The paper confirmed that the UK sees nuclear power as an essential part of the energy mix for a more secure and prosperous low-carbon Britain. With the objective of enabling companies to begin operation of new nuclear power stations between 2017 and 2020, we have taken active steps over the last year to establish and cement the right policy framework and create the right conditions in the UK for investment in new nuclear power stations.

On the question of regulation, the UK government is currently conducting a public consultation on a proposal to restructure the organisational framework of our national nuclear regulation. The idea is to create a new sector-specific independent regulator, with its own predominantly non-executive governing board that has clear lines of accountability to central government. It would have responsibility for safety, security, safeguards and transport functions, and enjoy enhanced autonomy. This would build on the existing regulatory strengths to create a modern organisation that is empowered to meet the challenges of the changing nuclear environment.

Towards a verification regime that ensures detection of non-compliance / Safeguards verification
As we look, worldwide, to a potential nuclear renaissance, we clearly seek to minimise the proliferation risks that can arise with an expansion of nuclear power.

In this regard, we believe that enhancing the Agency’s safeguards capabilities is of the utmost priority. We urge the Non-Nuclear Weapons States that still have to do so to conclude and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol and, whenever relevant, to amend their Small Quantities Protocol. The United Kingdom recalls, and strongly endorses, the wise words of the Director General at the June Board, when he said “that without the Additional Protocol, we cannot really do our work in a credible way.” We do not underestimate the technical challenges that the implementation of safeguards may entail for some countries. We remain ready, with the Agency and other Member States, to share with requesting countries best practice and expertise on safeguards implementation.

The Agency has repeatedly called on Member States as well as NPT parties during the third NPT Preparatory Committee to respond to the need for improvement of its technical capabilities. In this context, the UK has assisted IAEA safeguards since 1981 through its national Safeguards Support Programme. We are keen to update and improve the programme and would encourage the Agency to make a greater use of the support it provides, and of the UK’s facilities and expertise, including increased training of existing and new safeguards inspectors.

Beyond this, we believe that the safeguards regime should be continuously reviewed to ensure it is fit for purpose. Continued concerns with non-compliant and non-cooperative states indicate in our view that it may now be time to initiate an international discussion on what additional powers of inspection the Agency should be given in the future.

Madam Vice-President, let me now turn briefly to Iran and DPRK. The Director General's recent report on Iran makes clear once again that Iran is continuing its enrichment-related activities in defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions. Iran has belatedly agreed to IAEA access to the Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak and to improve monitoring at Natanz. These small and belated steps only go to highlight the many areas in which Iran is not fulfilling its responsibilities. The Director General has said Iran has not co-operated with the Agency on the outstanding issues with a possible military dimension for over a year. Implementation by Iran of the Additional Protocol, and the fulfilment of its commitments under the provisions of the revised Code 3.1 are essential steps if confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme is to be established. We call again on Iran to comply without qualification with its safeguards obligations and submit outstanding design information as requested by the Agency, including in relation to the nuclear power plant to be built at Darkhovin.

In the DPRK, we look to that country to fulfil its NPT obligations and resume co-operation with the Agency. We urge it to refrain from further provocative actions, and to re-engage in dialogue with the international community. Actions that breach UN Security Council Resolutions and NPT obligations undermine regional security and further isolate the DPRK.

Nuclear Security

Madam Vice-President, I would like to conclude with a few words on nuclear security. It is of the utmost importance that we ensure that terrorist groups, some of whom have the active intent to acquire and use nuclear devices, do not acquire that capability. The threat is real, and this is why the UK believes that the international community should recognise nuclear security as effectively a fourth pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation framework. Again, the IAEA has a key role to play.

Through helping member states to improve regulatory infrastructures and border monitoring, enhancing national capabilities and reducing the risk by securing radioactive sources, the Nuclear Security Programme has already achieved considerable success. However, assessment and evaluation missions have identified the need for further improvements by many Member States.
22. The UK considers that the IAEA has a vital role to play in matching up member state requirements on nuclear security with the capacity and expertise that exists among other members, facilitating a multilateral assistance relationship between them.

The IAEA, building on existing good work, is also in a unique position to ensure that all Member States possessing fissile material fulfil the responsibility they have to the global community to ensure it is fully secure. As we underlined in our Road to 2010, the UK would be keen to see a strengthening of the Agency’s role in the longer term in securing adherence to IAEA security guidelines, beyond the current voluntary arrangements.

The UK welcomes agreement on the extension of the Nuclear Security Programme through the 2010-2013 plan as a sound basis of enhanced co-operation with other countries on these issues. To underline our support to this programme we have contributed a further £4 million to the Nuclear Security Fund this year.

Thank you, Madam Vice-President.

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